Inconstitutional Turn: Indonesian Democracy Under the Threat of Executive Aggrandizement

Authors

  • Faizal Adi Surya Universitas Muria Kudus, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia
  • Bayu Aryanto Universitas Muria Kudus, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia
  • Arina Novitasari Universitas Muhammadiyah Kudus, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22437/jssh.v10i2.59465

Keywords:

Executive Aggrandizement, Constitutional Court, Democracy, Constitutional Disobedience, Inconstitutional Turn

Abstract

This article examines the phenomenon of the "Inconstitutional Turn" in Indonesia as a manifestation of Executive Aggrandizement that threatens the core principles of democracy and constitutionalism. Using a case study approach, the study highlights practices of constitutional disobedience by law enforcement agencies that revive legal norms previously declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Specifically, it analyzes the institutional resistance toward Constitutional Court Decision No. 114/PUU-XXIII/2025 regarding the assignment of active police officers and Decision No. 20/PUU-XXI/2023 concerning the Prosecutor's authority to file for Judicial Review (Peninjauan Kembali). The author argues that reviving such norms through technical regulations represents a "legalistic autocracy" strategy designed to bypass judicial review and paralyze the system of checks and balances. The analysis indicates that this trend aligns with global patterns of Abusive Constitutionalism and Stealth Authoritarianism, as observed in nations such as Israel, Hungary, and El Salvador. The article concludes that the Inconstitutional Turn has shifted the national paradigm from the rule of law toward rule by law, where legal instruments are weaponized to expand executive power and instrumentalize the bureaucracy for electoral political interests. Consequently, while the integrity of constitutional courts remains vital, they face increasing vulnerability to systematic marginalization when confronted with regimes employing Constitutional Hardball tactics

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Published

2026-08-28

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